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ABSTRACT
Capitalist countries have historically had quite different labour market institutions and social policies.
Do these differences produce sufficiently different economic outcomes to identify a single peak set of
institutions?
This paper shows that:
1. Labour market institutions have large effects on distribution, but modest hard-to-uncover effects
on efficiency.    
2.  Institutional diversity is increasing among advanced countries, as measured by the percentage
of workers covered by collective bargaining.  
3.  The case for the US having the institutions for peak economy status rests on its 1990s full
employment experience, which arguably counterbalances its high level of economic inequality 
The historical pattern whereby some capitalist countries do better than others in some periods (ie
Japan in the 1970s-1980s), then run into problems is more consonant with the view that capitalism permits
national differences in institutions to persist than with the view that all economies must converge to a single
institutional structure. 
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Capitalist countries have historically had quite different labour market institutions and social policies. 
High mobility and flexibility in the US.  Lifetime employment and steep seniority profiles  in Japan.
Corporatism in the Nordic countries and Austria.  Apprenticeships in Germany.   The SMIC minimum wage
and legislated work time in France.  Throughout the EU “social partners” negotiate arrangements, whereas in
North America the term has no meaning.  The labour market is potentially the most idiosyncratic market in
advanced capitalism.  
Do these different institutions and policies affect economic outcomes in important ways?  Can
institutional differences persist in a global economy or does competitiveness require that labour institutions
converge to a single dominant form?  Has the current lead candidate for peak economy, the US, found the
right institutions for the 21st Century?
To answer these questions, I develop criterion for determining whether there is a single optimum
configuration of capitalist institutions; review evidence on how institutions affect outcomes; and assess the
view that the US has found the dominant institutions for the new century.  The evidence shows that:
1. The institutional organization of the labour market has identifiable large effects on distribution, but
modest hard-to-uncover effects on efficiency.    
2.  Institutional diversity is increasing among advanced countries, as measured by the percentage of
workers covered by collective bargaining.  
These findings are more consonant with the view that capitalism is sufficiently robust for national
differences in labour institutions to persist than with the view that all economies must converge to a single
institutional structure.  In the space of labour institutions,  “You can have it your way”, albeit within some
bounds.   
 The case that the US has found the institutions for peak economy status rests on its 1990s full2
employment experience, which arguably counterbalances its high level of economic inequality compared to
other advanced capitalist countries.   If the US maintains full employment ad finitum while other advanced
countries fail to reduce joblessness, even critics of US economic performance will have to accord it peak
economy status.  But if the post-World War II experience is any guide to the future, the US will run into
employment problems at some point in the 2000-2010 period, which will give an economic model based on
full employment grave problems,  while other countries will modify their institutions in ways that will produce
new candidates for lead economy.
I.  The Problem: Single Peaked vs Diverse Capitalism
Every decade or so political or ideological groups, policy analysts, and, yes, even staid economists,
herald the coming of a new Ideal Economic Model -- a distinct set of institutions and organizations that has
maximal fitness in the period’s economic environment.  In the Great Depression many thought centralized
planning or government ownership of enterprises or government spending were needed for full employment. 
In the 1960s some saw French indicative planning as a viable compromise between centralization and
decentralization.  The 1970s oil shocks brought Nordic corporatist economic arrangements to the fore of
discussion (Bruno and Sachs, 1985).  In the 1980s the 900 pound gorilla on the economic scene was
Japan-- recall Ezra Vogel’s Japan as Number One, or the best-selling business book A Book of Five Rings
by the 14th century Samurai warrior Miyamoto Musashi. The early Clinton Administration looked jealously
at parts of Germany’s Rhineland Model and sought to expand the US welfare state through mandated health
insurance.  Major business school thinkers and journalists bemoaned Anglo-Saxon short termism in capital
markets and saw virtue in the Japanese or German banking and ownership patterns (Porter (1990); Hutton
(1996)).  At the turn of the 21st Century it is the US’s  turn to be the envy of the world, with many
observers seeing capitalist institutions US style as the lodestar for the next century.  3
Behind the claim that any particular set of institutions represents the ideal form of economic
arrangements is the notion that institutions and outcomes are related by a “landscape function” with a
particular shape.  Exhibit 1 depicts institutional arrangements along the X-axis and a general measure of
economic performance on the Y axis.  Since there are a multiplicity of arrangements across economies --
different modes of wage setting, systems for training workers, patterns of ownership of enterprises, etc. -- X
should be viewed as a vector of arrangements, aggregated in some fashion.     Similarly, since economic
performance involves distribution, efficiency, and growth, Y should be also be viewed as a vector of
outcomes, aggregated in some fashion.  
Landscape A represents the case of a dominant institutional structure.  It has a single peak at N*
(nirvana), with better efficiency and distribution than other institutional settings.  Every move in the direction
of N* raises well-being.  Thus, it behooves all economies to adopt those  institutions as quickly as they can:
they are Pareto-efficient improvements over other arrangements. This landscape represents the economic
world that adherents of any “Ideal Capitalist Model” envision.
But A is not the only plausible institution-outcome landscape.  Landscape B has multiple local peaks
separated by valleys.  To move from one peak to a higher one or to the global optimum requires that the
economy descend from the local peak before it ascends the higher one.  The fall in outcomes during the
transition is an investment in change.  If local optima are not much below nearby higher peaks or  the global
maximum it may not be worthwhile to make the investment, even though a country would choose the
superior institutions de novo.  The expense of changing institutions permits variety in the institutional
environment.
Landscapes C and D decompose the Y outcome into two outcomes, efficiency and equity, and map
them in a two dimensional diagram.  Both outcomes implicitly depend on insitutional arrangements.  In4
landscape C more equitable distributions and higher output are inversely related, possibly because the
supply of effort or other resources needed for efficient production is highly responsive to the incentives that
are the flip side of  inequality.  You pay your local billionaire huge sums or see GDP fall.  This is a world
dominated by the efficiency-equity trade-off.  If the trade-off is sufficiently steep inequality may even raise
the incomes of the poor so that more unequal distributions are desirable in terms of the income of all
citizens.1 
Landscape D shows a redistributionists’ ideal: a flat efficiency-distribution outcome around the peak. 
Within the broad range of the circle in the figure, institutions can affect distribution and output independently
of one another.  The lack of an equity-efficiency trade-off opens the door to political battles, class warfare,
etc.  Tax your local billionaire and give the money to the poor and GDP barely changes.  Alternatively, give
huge tax breaks to the billionaire or to special interest groups and again GDP barely changes.   Even here,
however, well-being falls sharply at some distance from the peak -- outside the circle in the exhibit.  The
failure of centrally planned economies, the retrogression of capitalist economies that fail to protect life and
property (as in Sub-Saharan Africa) and the problems of the former Soviet Union countries in moving to a
successful  market economy shows that the institution-landscape space is not a flat tabula rosa.
Which landscape best fits advanced economies as we move into the 21st Century?
Criteria for Deciding Among Landscapes 
Belief in a single peaked outcome function is deeply ingrained in economics. Models of optimizing
behavior assume convex functions so that first derivatives yield maximizing conditions and second derivatives
have the appropriate sign.  Globalization and information age technology have led more and more observers
on both the right and left to adopt a single-peaked view of the world.  The right argues for labor market
flexibility or a smaller welfare state as the only way to attain efficiency in the modern world.  The left worries5
about social dumping and the race to the bottom out of fear that firms or countries with low labour standards
will drive out those with high standards.
But there are arguments for diversified capitalism as well.  Comparative advantage is a story of
diversity; of gains that come from differing from one’s neighbor, not from aping him.  If for historic reasons
Germany can operate a tripartite social partnership and apprenticeship training model of capitalism better
than the US while the US is more adept at a high mobility/market wage setting model, Germany will do
better with its system and the US will do better with its system. Germany will outproduce the US in sectors
that use skilled blue collar labour and the US will outproduce Germany in low wage services and high-tech
industries; and the two countries will trade the products in which they have an advantage.  More broadly,
game theory has shown that interactive decision-making creates many potential outcomes, with institutional
rules or norms determining equilibrium (Kreps).  Finally, there is the Coasian world where side payments
guarantee an efficient outcome, whatever the property rights. 
What kind of evidence might help us to decide whether the modern institution-outcome landscape
best fits a single peak or a diversified capitalism?   
Exhibit 2 lists five factors that differentiate single peak landscapes from others.
The first criterion is that in a single peak world we can identify a best performing economy.  Ideally,
the peak economy should do better than other economies on all outcomes.  More pragmatically, I will
require that it does better on some weighted average of outcomes, recognizing that different folk may weigh
outcomes differently.2  If the US produces 20% more than France, and has higher income for 95% of the
population but lower income for the bottom 5%, I would accord the US the superior economic
performance, though John Rawls presumably would not.  Disagreement about the weights attached to
multiple outcomes creates the possibility that two societies will see the “same” institution-landscape space6
differently.  Differences in values across countries permits variety in institutions.  Greater preference
of Europeans than of Americans for economic security and equality arguably produces different valuations of
landscapes that allows each to prefer their own institutions.3 
The second criterion is that the single peak economy maintain its leading position over some
extended period.  In a world where landscapes change, the peak must be more than the flavor of the month
in outcome space.  Development economists usually make an even stronger demand.  Since less developed
countries have low levels of income per capita, the outcome that matters is the long term growth of per
capita income.  But among advanced economies candidates for peak economy invariably have high levels of
income per capita, which may give other economies a catch-up edge in growth, so I will again be more
moderate.   If the US produces 20% more than Germany, and loses just a bit of that edge over time, I
would still count the US as a candidate peak. 
The third criterion relates to the convexity of the landscape space around the peak. 
Economies close to the peak economy should have outcomes close to those of the peak economy.
Movements from the base of the mountain toward N* should raise well-being reasonably smoothly.  This
criterion will be important in assessing the candidacy of the US for peak since it requires that the US’s
closest neighbor in terms of economic institutions, Canada, perform about as well as the US.
The fourth criterion distinguishes single peaked landscapes by how large or radical changes toward
the peak from far away values affect outcomes. In a single-peaked landscape,  large-scale changes toward
the peak economy raise output since other economies have no local peak from which to descend.  In a
multiple-peaked landscape, by contrast, changes in institutions may produce long periods of  loss even in the
direction of more efficient institutions.
The final criterion relates to the dynamics of institutional change.  If the single peak hypothesis is7
correct, and if economies move toward better outcomes, there should be a long term convergence in
institutions toward the peak arrangements.  The greater the advantage of the peak economy, the more
rapidly will non-peak countries seek to mimic it.   If, contrarily, institutions diverge in a single peak
landscape, countries moving away from the peak will be going in the wrong direction and should suffer
accordingly.
My five criterion for the existence of a peak economy are, of course, nothing more than a verbal
translation of the mathematical conditions for the existence of a global optimum, together with a dynamic
process that makes the optimum an attractor in institution-outcome space, drawing more and more
economies in its basin of attraction.  
Measures of Institutions
Thus far, I have been vague about what lies on the institution axis in Exhibit 1.  The reason is that
there is no generally accepted taxonomy for classifying economies into different institutional groupings, nor
even a scale to measure the distance between particular institutional settings.  Are Japanese institutions
closer to those of the US or of Germany?   Are UK institutions more American or European?  We have no
measures of institutions to answer these questions definitively.  Lacking well-defined taxonomies or metrics
of distance between institutions, researchers generally proceed in an ad hoc inductive manner, classifying
institutions on the basis of observation and the differences relevant to policy discussion.  
Most analyzes of institutions across country lines treat the degree of centralization or
coordination of wage-setting as the key determinant of outcomes.  In part this is because the oil price shock
of the 1970s produced different inflation and unemployment outcomes in corporatist and liberal countries,
motivating much early work on the economic effects of labour institutions (Crouch; Tarantelli (19850; Bruno
and Sachs (1985)).  Developments in the 1980s, however, suggested that corporatist and liberal economies8
did about as well in important outcomes, with the worst performances in countries that had institutions with
industry-level bargaining (Calmfors and Driffill (1988); Freeman (1988).   Mancur Olson’s arguments that
an all-encompassing union would internalize the externalities of inflationary wage increases and favor non-
inflationary wage agreements provide a theoretic base for this perspective.  Studies in the late 1990s were
largely concerned with the unemployment experience of countries in the 1990s and on the economic effects
of labour market flexibility on unemployment.  The OECD categorized countries by legislated restrictions on
labour market behaviour, such as employment protection laws, modes of training, unemployment benefit
systems, or active labour market policies (see OECD, Jobs Study and Employment Outlooks, July 1997,
July 1999).   The OECD Jobs Study came down strongly in favour of deregulation and active labour market
policies, but succeeding analyses by the OECD have highlighted the weakness of that case.  Countries with
very different regulatory practices and policies have surprisingly similar outcomes.
It requires considerable expertise to determine accurately  institutional arrangements for countries. 
You cannot visit Belgium on Tuesday and Denmark on Wednesday, or do a quick internet search for
relevant statistics, code up the available indicators, and come up with a valid measure of how institutions
operate in those countries, any more than you can understand how gorilla bands or ant colonies or dolphins
behave by checking them out on your holiday.  One problem is that readily available measures of institutions
may not reflect actual practice.  Spain and France have low levels of unionization, but collective bargaining
determines wages throughout much of their economies.  Published data show that the Ukraine is the most
highly unionized country in the world, with China not far behind (Visser, 1998), but unions surely do not
affect those economies as they do the French or Spanish economies, much less the Nordic ones.  Most EU
countries mandate works councils at workplaces, but councils vary differently across countries (Rogers and
Streeck).  The EU has enacted more protective labour legislation than the US, but the US has pioneered9
affirmative action programs and Americans regularly sue firms in court over alleged violations of labour
rights.  Does a works council and the EU Social Charter affect firms and market outcomes more than a
court suit in the US?  Many economists think the answer is yes, but there is no definitive study evaluating the
costs/benefits of the two different forms of regulating market outcomes.
Turning to the developing world, many LDCs have extensive labour codes, often copied from
advanced countries, and many subscribe to ILO conventions, but all too often the countries do not
implement  the codes or conventions.  Does a country which adopts more ILO conventions or which has
more interventionist laws intervene more in the labour market than other countries?  It depends on whether
the state enforces these regulations, which varies across countries and over time.  Most less developed
countries have minimum wages but during the 1980s debt crisis, these wages proved to be sawdust rather
than hardwood; and the existence of a sizable informal sector may make them inapplicable to many
employees in any case.  In poorer countries, where public employees may be low paid, bribery offers a way
around regulations to a greater extent than in a wealthier country.
Finally, there is the “systems” problem that the same institution or policy may affect outcomes
differently depending on other economic institutions.  In the 1980s Germany and Spain enacted laws that
encouraged temporary contracts.  In Spain the proportion of workers covered by these contracts increased
massively, until about one-third of employees worked under such contracts.  In Germany there was virtually
no growth of temporary contracts.  German apprenticeships and works councils preserved permanent jobs. 
Prior to the Thatcher labour law reforms,  British unions were the troglodytes of the advanced world, often
dominated by small groups of leftists seeking industrial strife.  In the 1990s British unions are arguably the
most progressive in Europe, seeking partnerships with management and endorsing “value added” unionism.  
The same institution, the trade union, adopted different policies in a different legal and economic10
environment.  To treat UK unions as the same in the 1990s as in the 1970s would be a gross misreading of
British labour institutions.
   Analysts have struggled with the systems problem.  Some add interactive terms in regressions of
outcomes on particular institutions so that, say employment protection legislation has a different effect on
outcomes in countries with centralized wage-setting than on countries with decentralized wage-setting
(OECD, 1998).   Comparative social scientists have taken the interactive model to its natural limits by
treating each configuration of institutions as a separate case in a Boolean “qualitative comparative analysis”
(Charles Ragin).   Other analysts have developed typologies that measure observed institutions along a uni-
dimensional scale by summing different indicators.   Another approach is to let measures of institutions
“speak for themselves” through cluster analysis or factor analysis or some related technique, which hopefully
creates comprehensible groupings. 
  An alternative to categorizing institutions inductively is to take the competitive economic model as a
point of departure and to measure the distance of actual economies from this polar case. The Heritage
Foundation has developed an Economic Freedom index that rates economies by the degree to which the
market is free to determine prices/wages and other outcomes.  While one may object to the particulars of
the Heritage rating scheme,4 this “thermometer” approach has the virtue of placing economies on a scale
with a conceptual zero point tied to economic theory.  In a similar vein the World Economic Forum offers its
“competitiveness” ranking of economies.  Both scales suffer from the problem that the teams that put
together the scales cannot possibly know how things “really” work in individual countries and may be overly
sensitive to au currant views of what is the most successful set of institutional arrangements or policies.
Firm-level Institutions
Studies of how the organization and policies of firms affect outcomes treat two issues: the allocation11
of decision-making powers within firms, and the effects of incentive pay on performance.  Institutions that
allocate decision-making range widely from employee involvement committees to works councils to diverse
quality of work programs.   Incentive programs range from group or individual bonuses to stock options to
pension funds that invest in company shares, employee stock ownership plans, and stock options.  In both
cases, there is a serious problem in measuring the true policy or mode of operation. Top management may
institute an open door personnel policy, a formal affirmative action program, quality of work and employee
involvement committees, and so forth, but local managers may implement these policies in very different
ways or they may ignore them almost completely.  Anyone who has visited company headquarters and then
gone to local branches or plants realizes that there is a huge gap between what the top of the company says
and what actually happens on the ground floor.  The result is that measures of the policies are subject to
considerable error.  Assessing the impact of incentive pay schemes is similar:  many firms have multiple
policies, whose net effect on workers’ incomes is difficult to determine.   The same firm may have an ESOP,
a bonus gain-share plan, a stock option plan, and a 401k retirement plan where the employee can put some
funds into company stock.  The fastest growing form of incentive pay in the US, all-employee stock option
plans, poses a particularly stark problem for economic analysis.  In the standard model of rational behaviour,
options cannot motivate ordinary employees whose daily actions are too far removed and too modest to
affect stock prices.  Options may make lots of sense for the CEO of Starbucks or Asda, but why should the
firm also give them to clerks in local stores?  One possibility is that the firm seeks to use this form of pay to
help establish a particular type of corporate culture, rather than to create individual incentives. 
The absence of a general metric for measuring institutions at the national or firm level creates a
problem for institutional economics.  Measurement is, after all, the sine qua non of any scientific endeavor. 
The parallel problem in the biological sciences, defining species and varieties within a specie, has generated12
much attention and detailed work, with taxonomists battling over alternative ways to classify organisms: by
function or evolutionary history (Ridley).  But at the end of the day biologists can use differences in DNA to
measure distances in familial heritage.  We have no such instructional code to measure the relations among
economic institutions. 
From this litany of the weaknesses and problems in institutional analysis, one might expect that we
have learned little from work in the area.  To the contrary, empirical research has yielded important findings
which seem robust to alternative measures of institutions and to varied empirical strategies for estimating the
effect of institutions on outcomes.
II.  Institutions, Distribution, and Efficiency
Many studies have examined the links between institutions and the distribution of wages or incomes
or the efficiency of production.  There are cross section contrasts of workers/firms covered by diverse
institutional arrangements (unionized or nonunionized; employee owned or not; profit-sharing or not);
longitudinal contrasts of the same person/firm operating under different wage-setting systems; comparisons
of countries with different institutions; and before/after analyses of changes in national policies.  The vast bulk
of studies support two empirical generalizations: 
First, that wage-setting institutions reduce inequality in economic rewards. 
Second, that most wage-setting and rule-making institutions have modest effects on
efficiency outcomes.
Distribution
Exhibit 3 summarizes the results of studies that link the dispersion of wages to labour market
institutions.  The vast bulk of this literature takes the wages of individuals as the basic data and compares the
distribution of wages among workers  covered by the collective bargaining with the distribution of wages13
among nominally equivalent workers not covered by collective bargaining.  Some studies use regression
analyses to identify demographic equivalence; others contrast the pay of narrowly defined groups, such as
production workers in union and non-union plants in a given industry.  Regression analyses invariably find
that years of schooling, age and other determinants of earnings have a smaller effect on union workers than
on nonunion workers in ln earnings equations, and that unions have a larger impact on the wages of low paid
and low skilled workers than on the wages of high paid and high skilled workers.  This explains part of the
lower dispersion of wages among unionists.  But most of the union-nonunion difference shows up in the
residuals from regressions: among workers of the same gender, age, years of schooling, occupation, and
industry, union employees have lower dispersion of pay than nonunion employees.  Consistent with this,
studies that contrast pay structures within-establishments show markedly smaller within-establishment
dispersion of wages in organized establishments than in non-organized establishments.  By its very nature,
collective bargaining reduces the prevalence of merit pay and other forms of discretionary wage-setting
within firms, lowering dispersion among similar workers, while it  increases the pay of union members
relative to management, professional workers and the like.  
The skeptic may question the interpretation of these types of comparisons as reflecting the causal
effects of unionism on outcomes.  Perhaps the real reason for the difference in pay distributions is that
workers in organized establishments differ from those in non-organized establishments in unobservable
characteristics.  Perhaps the market responds to union wage structures by reallocating workers so as to
establishment similar wage structures measured in efficiency units between organized and unorganized
sectors.  Assume, for instance, that collective bargaining initially compresses wages by raising pay for the
least skilled and lowering pay for the most skilled.  The narrower structure of wages in the organized sector
will give firms an incentive to shun the least skilled workers and search for the most skilled, but will give the14
most skilled workers an incentive to look for jobs in the nonunion sector.  The interplay of demand and
supply will produce an equilibrium in which both the most skilled workers and the least skilled workers will
work nonunion while union firms will hire workers with middling skills.  In this case, the fact that the
dispersion of wages in the union sector is lower than in the nonunion sector does not imply that unions
reduce the distribution of pay in the entire economy.  Instead,  the compression of pay in the union sector
would have re-allocated workers by level of skill across sectors.  Since virtually all studies of union/nonunion
pay differentials show higher pay for organized workers than for non-organized workers with comparable
measured skills, moreover, the selectivity or reallocation interpretation of the difference between union and
non-union pay structures implies that on average union workers should be more skilled than nonunion
workers.
 One way to test this argument is to examine the wages of the same worker under union and
nonunion conditions.  In its strongest form, the argument is that workers with the same characteristics earn
the same pay in both sectors, so that differences in  wages across sectors are due to the selectivity of
workers into the sectors.   Longitudinal studies show that the wages of workers who move from union to
nonunion jobs (and conversely) differ by less than do the wages of  union and nonunion workers in cross
section studies, implying some selectivity of workers into the sectors.  But the estimated impact of unionism
is still sizable and much of the reduction appears due to the greater impact of measurement error in union
status on the longitudinal estimates than on cross sectional estimates on union wage effects.  But, as argued
above, to explain the smaller dispersion of pay among unionists requires a more subtle form of selectivity
than union sectors attracting better workers: it requires that union firms have fewer workers at both the low
end of the skill distribution but also at the high end of the distribution.  A direct test of the potential effect of
selectivity on the distribution of wages is to compare the pay of workers who leave union jobs with that of15
workers who move into union jobs.  Such comparisons show that dispersion rises among those who leave
union jobs (implying that their wages were truly compressed under unionism) while dispersion falls among
those who enter union jobs (with the same implication).
There are other possible ways for firms to offset union negotiated wage increases so that the lower
dispersion of pay among union workers could be spurious.  Firms could reduce other costly benefits, such
as private pensions or expenditures on health, etc, for low skilled union workers.  This does not happen: the
share of compensation going to supplementary benefits is higher under collective bargaining, and unions
increase these benefits more for low wage workers than for higher paid workers.  Rather than creating
compensating differentials in benefits, collective bargaining diffuses fringe benefits such as private pension
plans and privately provided medical insurance programs to lower paid and blue collar workers, reducing
the inequality in provision of these benefits.  In countries with centralized wage-setting, wages drift at the
plant or among individual workers -- changes in wages in excess of collectively bargained settlements -- 
could also undo the effect of centralized narrowing of the wage distribution.  Wages drift does, indeed,
operate in this way, but the effects of drift do not come close to undoing the narrowing of wages negotiated
in central agreements (Hibbs)  
The estimated effect of unionization on the dispersion of pay between unionized and non-unionized
workers within a country does not, however, answer the question of what collective bargaining does to the
distribution of pay economy-wide.  This is because comparisons of the pay structure in the unionized and
nonunionized sectors of the economy do not allow for the effects of pay-setting in one sector on the other. 
Consider, for example, what happens if nonunion employers mimic union wage patterns to avoid
unionization.  In this case, the within-country difference in dispersion of pay between sectors will understate
the effect of unionism on the overall wage distribution.  Alternatively, nonunion firms might increase their skill16
premium to keep their more skilled workers from organizing, so that the within-country difference in
dispersion of pay across sectors might exaggerate the effect of unionism on the dispersion of pay.  
The way to deal with this problem is to compare the dispersion of pay across countries with more or
less extensive collective bargaining.  Such comparisons show that centralized bargaining is associated with
lower dispersion of pay in a country and with a much narrower structure of wages by industry than in
countries with decentralized bargaining.  Workers with nominally the same skills are more likely to be paid
similar wages in different industries in Sweden or the Netherlands than in the US.  One interpretation is that
collective bargaining moves industrial wage structures closer to the competitive ideal than does market
wage-setting.  In decentralized markets, prosperous firms distribute economic rents to workers while firms
that do poorly squeeze the pay of workers with high mobility costs.  In markets with centralized wage-
setting, all firms pay the same wage.   Studies also show, however, that occupational differentials are smaller
in countries with collective bargaining than in other countries, with potentially deleterious effects on
investments in skill.
To illustrate the degree to which institutions affect the distribution of wages, exhibit 4 shows the
dispersion of wages of nominally comparable persons in highly unionized Sweden and in the largely nonunion
USA.  The exhibit records the ratio of pay in selected percentiles of the earnings distribution for persons of
Swedish ancestry, defined as those with both parents of Swedish descent, in both countries.5  When Anders
Bjorkland and I first planned this tabulation, we expected that the Americans of Swedish parentage would
have a more compressed earnings distribution than other Americans, probably somewhere between US and
Swedish levels of inequality.  After all, the Swedes in the US were persons with similar genetic and family
background as the Swedes in Sweden, whereas all Americans included persons of more diverse
backgrounds.  Instead, we obtained the results in the exhibit: levels of inequality for Americans of Swedish17
descent nearly as large as those of all Americans, and nowhere near the levels of inequality in Sweden.  By
contrast, immigrants to Sweden, including non-Nordic immigrants who come from diverse places, have
Swedish-level inequality.  It’s the wage-setting institutions, not ethnic background, that produces widely
different distributions of incomes across countries.
Finally, if wage-setting institutions are critical determinants of the distribution of earnings in a country,
changes in those institutions should be associated with changes in the distribution of pay.  This is the case. 
The introduction of centralized bargaining in Sweden in the 1960s was accompanied by a substantial decline
in the dispersion of wages and a reduction in the premium to education.  The withdrawal of Swedish
employers from centralized bargaining in 1983 was followed by a gradual rise in dispersion of pay across
and within industries and a rise in the premium to education.  Italian experience with the Scala Mobile tells
the same story: a huge reduction in inequality during the period when the Scala Mobile determined wages
followed by an increase in inequality with the end of this centralized system of wage-setting.  In the US the
fall in union density from the 1970s through the 1990s explains about one-fifth of the rise in the dispersion of
wages, while in the UK the fall in density also contributed to the rise in inequality in that country.
In sum, diverse forms of non-experimental evidence shows that the primary wage-setting institution
in modern capitalism, collective bargaining, reduces the dispersion of pay.  Indeed, the inequality reducing
effect of institutional wage-setting is a more ubiquitous feature of unionism than is the widely studied effect of
unions in raising the wages of members, as it is found even in countries where unions have little impact on
members pay relative to non-members because collective bargaining covers the vast bulk of the work
force.6
Efficiency
In contrast to the near ubiquitous finding that institutional wage-setting significantly affects the18
distribution of pay, the evidence that labour market institutions have substantial effects on economic
efficiency is frail (see Exhibit 5).  Analyses of firms that operate with different institutional forms shows that
these forms have modest impacts on productivity.  Studies of minimum wages (Card and Krueger), of
employment protection legislation (OECD, Employment Outlook, 1999) and of diverse other social
protection programs (Blank) find little or no impact of these institutional interventions on economic efficiency. 
This does not mean that government interventions or union wage-setting or other policies cannot cause
major economic problems (add a 0 after the US minimum wage and much of the economy would close
tomorrow; give a trade union monopoly power over a critical part of the economy and it may very well act
irresponsibly, as the Peronista unions did in Argentina for many years).  Rather, the evidence indicates that
the interventions that advanced capitalist economies implement rarely approach such levels, presumably
because neither the government nor the citizenry can tolerate policies that reduce efficiency greatly.
Consider first the evidence on how different company institutions affect outcomes (Exhibit 5).  There
are four main ways in which companies seek to motivate workers financially to be more productive: through
direct incentive pay; through local group incentives, often called gain-sharing; through profit-sharing at the
level of the firm; and through some form of ownership of shares.   In addition, many US firms have instituted
employee involvement programs of various forms (team work, TQM, quality circles) that empower workers
to make decisions without any immediate financial pay-off to them, beyond the benefits that a more
successful firm brings to employees in general.
Basic economic principles predict that companies which reward workers with incentive pay should
reap higher productivity while at the same time increasing the dispersion of pay.  This is what studies that
compare time rates of pay with piece rate modes of pay find.   Linking incentives and productivity tightly
linked at the individual level with piece rates increases individual output and the dispersion of pay, implying a19
steep equity-efficiency trade-off.  The historic decline of piece rate modes of payment is not because
individual incentives do not work, but because companies have problems measuring output and controlling
worker gaming in the setting of norms to which the rates apply in a rapidly changing technological
environment.  Gain-sharing and other forms of sharing of improvements in costs or profits at the local level,
where the free rider problem is modest, should also have positive effects on productivity and this too
appears to be the case.  Economic analysis predicts a more ambiguous effect for general profit-sharing,
since the incentive to the individual will be largely offset by the diffusion of the gain from his or her effort to
the group -- the 1/n free-rider problem -- and for employee ownership when large numbers of workers are
involved.  The danger that workers will free ride on the efforts of others can, however,  be offset by
workers’ monitoring other workers, or by profit-sharing/ownership creating a team oriented participative
corporate culture.  Reviewing some 20 studies of profit-sharing, Kruse and Weitzman concluded that profit-
sharing raises productivity by 4%; while Kruse has found that profit-sharing firms also have less variability in
employment fluctuations.  Studies of employee owned firms show weaker positive impacts of ownership on
productivity, with more reliable results for smaller firms than for larger firms.  
Finally, while some studies of employee involvement programs find modest productivity results others find
negligible effects. Institutions that give workers a share in decision-making but not a share in the rewards of
better decisions seems to be less effective in raising productivity than institutions that create financial
incentives to be more productive.  The most intriguing finding here, however, is that a firm that introduces a
single advanced human resource practice -- say job rotation -- gains little or nothing from this policy unless it
also implements an entire package of complementary policies, such as training, gain-sharing, grievance
procedures, and so on (Ichniowski, Shaw, Prennushi). 
Whether unionization is associated with higher or lower productivity has been extensively examined20
by estimating production functions with a union variable entered along with capital and labor as an input into
production. Approximately 2/3rds of extant studies find that unionized plants have higher productivity than
do non-union plants, though the differential does not cover the extra costs that unions bring to the enterprise. 
The remaining 1/3rd of studies find that unionism is associated with lower productivity.  But there is also
evidence that unionized sectors invest less in research and development, which is likely to have adverse
effects on long term productivity growth.  Studies of the impact of firms on productivity growth in the US
find such a relation but studies for the UK tell a more complex story: an adverse union effect on productivity
during the pre-Thatcher “bad industrial relations” period but not afterwards, when unions modernized their
policies.   
The bottom line is that firms that give workers pecuniary incentives and institute participative labor
relations practices have modestly higher productivity than other firms, with more extensive programs having
larger effects, but none of these variants has such a productivity edge as to dominate markets.  Which is
presumably why they co-exist with firms that use more traditional wage and personnel practices, often in
different market niches. 
Consider next how unionism, collective bargaining, and diverse government interventions in labor
markets affect macro-economic efficiency.  Here, analyses have gone through several phases.  In the late
1970s/early1980s, many analysts argued that centralized bargaining or corporatist arrangements were
superior in efficiency since, as noted earlier, these arrangements seemed to produce a better inflation-
unemployment trade-off.  In the late 1980s, analysts held that either centralized or decentralized bargaining
were superior to industry level bargaining.  But with the success of the US economy in the 1990s, many
have begun to argue that decentralized institutions like those in the US were better suited for the new
information technology and global economy.  But even here there is some unease with the generalization.  In21
1997 the OECD, which had endorsed deregulation of markets in its Jobs Study,  reported “a negative
conclusion” that collective bargaining affected macro-economic outcomes with one exception: “a fairly
robust relation between cross-country differences in earnings inequality and bargaining structure” (OECD,
Employment Outlook,  July 1997, p 64).
What is one to make of these changing generalizations?  One interpretation is that the generalizations
correctly capture the link between institutions and outcomes in specific time period, subject to a particular
world economic environment, but do not generalize to other periods or circumstances. But if this correct, the
generalizations are nothing more than hindsight theories, explaining historical patterns, with little predictive
power for the future.    
With respect to governmental interventions, the most widely publicized intervention in the labour
market is the minimum wage.  Card and Krueger found that late 1980s-early 1990s increases in minimum
wages in some US states and in the federal minimum had no effects (or even positive effects) on
employment.  Using  different research designs or data, some economists have obtained similar results while
others report losses of employment with modest elasticities of demand (around -0.10).  From the
perspective of economic efficiency, all of these estimates suggest that the minimum wage at the level enacted
in the US has no substantial economic cost.  A zero elasticity of demand implies that the only thing the
minimum wage does is redistribute earnings.  An elasticity of -0.10 implies a minuscule efficiency loss using
standard Harberger welfare triangles.
Many governments intervene on the employment side of the market with employment protection
legislation that gives some property rights to jobs to workers rather than to management.  Others such as the
US or UK have little such protection and rely largely on employment at will. Economic theory in the form of
the Coase theorem says that employment protection legislation should not affect efficiency, as long as22
transactions costs are small.  In this case, employers and workers should reach the efficient outcome through
bargaining and side payments regardless of who has the property right to the job.  If my work is no longer
valuable but I own my job, the firm buys me out with some early retirement or severance scheme.  If the firm
owns the job and my employment is no longer efficient, it fires me.  In both cases, I am gone, but in the
former case, I gain some of the rewards from the improved operation of the firm due to my departure,
whereas in the latter, the firm obtains all of the gain.  The implication is that employment protection legislation
should have no effect on employment, but should affect the distribution of the benefits/costs of changes in
employment.  
Studies that contrast unemployment in countries with stronger/weaker employment protection laws
generally support the predictions of theory.  In its 1999 examination the OECD reported that “simple cross
country correlations suggest that EPL has little or no effect on overall unemployment” (OECD July 1999
Employment Outlook, p 50) -- and found that this negligible relation held up in multivariate regression
modeling.   In addition, countries that weakened their employment protection legislation in the hope of
improving labour outcomes have not increased employment or reduced joblessness.  Spain introduced fixed
term (temporary) contracts in the mid-1980s, but in the late 1990s Spain still had the highest rate of
joblessness among advanced OECD countries.   Employment protection legislation does appear, however,
to affect the dynamics of joblessness: countries with strong employment protection laws have longer spells of
employment and unemployment.  In addition, some studies also find that it affects the composition of
unemployment, lowering unemployment for adult men and raising it for other groups.7   The bottom line is
that employment protection legislation alters the distribution of work but not its volume.
trends in institutional forms
The fifth criterion for a single-peaked landscape in exhibit 2 is that economies with below peak23
institutions should move toward those with peak institutions, or, if that does not occur, that countries moving
away the peak should fall further behind the peak economy.  Given the lack of any accepted measure of the
distance of institutions, it is difficult to test this criterion broadly.  But the two most widely used measures of
the extent of institutional wage-setting in a country -- union density and the degree of collective bargaining
coverage -- have changed in a way that is inconsistent with the prediction that all forms of capitalism are
converging on a single institutional pattern.  Rather than converging, the extent of union-related pay setting
has diverged among advanced countries, without causing any parallel divergence in income per capita or
productivity measures of economic efficiency.
Exhibit 6 documents the divergence in the rate of union density and collective bargaining coverage
across OECD countries between 1980 and 1994.  It groups the country into several categories that reflect
the pattern of change in the two measures of institutional influence on the labour market.  Countries with high
unionization/collective bargaining coverage maintained or even increased those levels over time while
countries with low levels of unionization/collective bargaining fell further behind the OECD average.  The
summary measures of dispersion at the bottom of the table -- coefficients of variation and ratios of high to
low density or coverage – all increase.  
What about the other side of this prediction -- that if countries (foolishly) do not move to the peak
institutional form, their economic performances will diverge?  Exhibit 7 records the dispersion of GDP per
capita in purchasing power parity terms among advanced countries in selected years from 1970 to 1997.  It
gives the coefficient of variation in per capita incomes for all advanced OECD countries and for all of those
countries less the three poorest, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece.8 Contrary to the peak economy prediction,
the dispersion of GDP per capita fell over this period for all countries and even fell, albeit modestly, for the
higher income advanced countries.  The changes in GDP per capita among countries were, moreover,24
unrelated  to institutional arrangements.  Some economies with highly corporatist institutional arrangements
like Sweden fell in the per capita GDP tables while others like Norway or Austria did not. Countries like the
UK or New Zealand which have adopted more US-style market arrangements did not improve their
position relative to other advanced countries.  All told, the convergence of GDP per capita provides little
support for the notion that economic progress requires a single set of institutions.
III.  The US -- Peak Economy?
Still, at the turn of Y2K,  the performance of one economy holds centre stage as the potential single-
peak capitalist economy: the United States.  Afficionados of American style capitalism see a “new economy”
in the US’s high employment, minimal inflation, and rapid progress in technological frontier industries. Critics
note that the US also has the highest level of inequality and child poverty among major economies, but the
full employment boom of  the late 1990s has lessened some of those concerns by narrowing inequalities and
reducing poverty. 
How well does the US fit the criterion for peak economy at the turn of the century?
Columns 1-3 of Exhibit 8 show that the US outperformed other advanced countries in employment
and unemployment and has generated more hours worked per employed adult than other advanced
countries.  It is this record that makes the US the late 1990s candidate peak economy, supplanting the
previous decades’ candidate, Japan, which suffered rising unemployment and an extended recession.  But
the superior US performance in generating jobs did not carry over to some other important outcome
variables, such as the level of productivity and growth or the economic well-being of lower income citizens. 
In the 1990s output per hour worked in the US was roughly on a par with output per hour worked in
Germany, France, and some smaller EU countries (Freeman, 1996; Conference Board; Mckinsey Institute). 
The US also did not outperform other economies in the rate of growth of GDP per capita or in the growth of25
productivity (columns 4 and 5 of Exhibit 8A), while the rate of growth of compensation was smaller than in
most other countries (column 6).  This would seem to suggest that productivity is not particularly sensitive to
differences between US and EU institutions while wage settlements are responsive, consistent with the main
theme of this essay.  But there is an alternative interpretation.  The Economist reads the comparable
productivity experience of advanced OECD countries as evidence for the superiority of the American
model,  “if Germany and Japan can grow as fast as America even when their incentives are blunted by an
inflexible model, imagine what they might do were their economies to be set free.”9  The not-so-subtle
message, which Americans will have trouble digesting, is that Germans and Japanese would be better
workers or managers than Americans if only they operated on a level playing field with Americans.  
With similar productivity per hour worked between the US and many EU countries, the greater
hours worked per adult employee and higher employment-population ratio in the US translates into a
sizeable American advantage in per capita income.  Column 1 of exhibit 8B shows that per capita income is
on the order of 20-30 percent higher in the US than in other advanced countries.  But this exaggerates the
American edge in living standards.   Greater hours worked in the market means fewer hours of leisure or of
time worked at home.  Since leisure is desirable, any social value function that combined leisure and goods
per capita would bring EU countries closer to the US in overall economic well-being.  Given that  hours
worked per worker and per adult rose in the US relative to other countries from the 1970s to the 1990s,
moreover, the US advantage in living standards would seem to have eroded.   But the real problem the US
has in passing the first criterion is its performance in distribution.  Exhibit 8B shows that the US’s advantage
in per capita incomes does not extend to the entire distribution of earnings.  The US is # 1 in per capita
income, but # 13 in per capita income for those in the lower decile of earnings.  It is not until the 30th to
40th decile that the US surpasses most other advanced countries in per capita income.  So for the US to26
meet the first criterion, we must weigh employment heavily and weigh distribution lightly in the social value
function. 
The second criterion for peak economic status relates to the time period in which the candidate peak
economy has been in the forefront.  At this writing (2000) the US has had lower unemployment than the EU
for roughly a decade and has lower unemployment than  Japan for two years.  From the 1950s to the
1980s, the rate of unemployment was higher than in countries with more institutional wage-setting, such as
Germany, Sweden, Australia, and Japan, among others.  Measured by employment to population rates the
US superior performance dates back to the mid-1970s.  In 1973 the US and OECD-Europe had the same
employment-population rate.  Since then the US rate has risen while the European rate has fallen to produce
a 19 point differential in 1997!    The $64,000 question is whether the US can maintain its full employment
edge.  Many analysts believe that the 1990s combination of huge jobs growth with little inflation was largely
a matter of luck -- negative shocks to prices combined with temporary unease over job security.   Others
argue the opposite.  While there are enough trouble-spots in the US economy to raise doubts about the
sustainability of an unemployment rate of 4% to 5% -- the low savings rate; high consumer debt; the large
trade deficit --the US also has marked areas of strength.  The US has a higher productive research and
development sector, more venture capital than other countries, and a bankruptcy code that encourages risk-
taking by entrepreneurs that may very well enable it to take a first movers’ advantage on new technological
developments and maintain its newly admirable employment record.   In one sense,  the US has put all of its
eggs in the full employment basket, and at this writing has reaped the rewards.  With full employment, the
US does well enough to be a legitimate candidate for peak.  Absent full employment, believers in a single-
peaked landscape will have to find another candidate – Ireland? (the Leprechaun model), the Netherlands?
(the Polder Model), or maybe even, France? (the Asterix Model!)27
Criterion 3 for the single peak landscape requires that near neighbors to the proposed peak
economy also do relatively well in outcome space.  Even without a formal distance measure, most analysts
will accept that Canada is the US’s closest neighbor institutionally as well as geographically.  For many years
Canada and the US stood together at the top of the per capita GDP tables.  In 1990 Canada stood third in
the GDP per capita league tables, below Switzerland and the US, but sufficiently above EU countries to
support the notion that North American institutions generated higher average living standards than those in
other advanced countries.  But the 1990s were a period of economic trouble for Canada.  In 1997,
following a decade of economic decline/stagnation Canada had fallen in the league tables to 7th position  --
the largest fall this side of the Swedish Third Way.    The main reason for this fall was a drop in employment
per capita -- precisely the outcome on which the US did so well.  One interpretation of the disparate
performances of the US and Canada is that Canada has just not gone far enough toward the US model, but
this explanation has trouble accounting for Canada’s strong performance until the 1990s.   An alternative
interpretation is that the institutions-outcome landscape does not fit the single peak paradigm.  Rather the
landscape is more jagged, subject to shocks having little to do with institutions, so that countries with similar
institutions can do quite differently in any given time period.
The fourth criterion for a single peak landscape is that economies making radical changes toward the
peak economy should improve their outcomes.  In the European Union, the UK is generally viewed as the
economy most similar to the US, and the reforms enacted by the Thatcher, Major, and Blair governments
have brought the UK even closer to the American model.  Has this improved the position of the UK in the
league per capita income tables?  No.  In 1980 the UK was 16th in the league tables; in 1997 it was 18th.10 
Outside Europe, the economy which has undertaken the most radical reforms is New Zealand.  New
Zealand deregulated much of its labor market, freed its central bank from political control, and introduced a28
variety of free trade measures.  It “out-Thatchered Mrs T”.  With what result?  In 1996 New Zealand
ranked last in per capita income with an income per capita some 20% below that of its natural pair,
Australia.  In 1980 New Zealand was also last among the countries, with an income per capita 11 percent
below that of Australia.  
It is possible that extenuating circumstances explain the failure of radical reform to produce the
expected outcomes.  Perhaps the UK would have fallen in the per capita output tables without the reforms. 
It was falling in per capita income compared to France and Germany from the 1950s through the 1970s. 
New Zealand may have had such serious problems prior to its reforms that absent such it would have fallen
more than 20% below Australia.  Perhaps, but once more a simpler explanation is that the single peak
landscape vision of capitalism is wrong.
In short, the safest reading of the past several decades is that there is no single peak set of capitalist
institutions, and that performances vary for many reasons rather than that the lead economy in any period
has found the ideal institutional arrangements.
IV. Conclusion
To return to the three questions that motivated this paper.
Do idiosyncratic labour market institutions or policies affect economic outcomes in
important ways?   
My answer is yes, that the institutions associated with collective bargaining and other forms of
institutional wage-setting substantially reduce the dispersion of earnings.  They are not the mere crowing of
Cantillon’s cock, who imagines he raises the sun every morning with his cock-a-doodle-doo.  But
institutions have much weaker and uncertain effects on efficiency outcomes.  At the company level profit-
sharing, employee ownership, and other forms of devolving decision-making have modest effects on29
productivity.  At the country level, many institutional interventions have barely discernible impacts on the
allocation of resources.  That economists can barely detect any impact of minimum wages on employment or
of employment protection legislation on unemployment or of collective bargaining on any outcome besides
the distribution of earnings suggests that the null hypothesis should be that institutions have “negligible effects”
on national efficiency, at least within the experience of the advanced countries.   
Why might institutions have a greater effect on distribution than on efficiency?
One possible explanation is that the relevant elasticities of response are small, at least within the time
periods considered, with much of distributional differences among countries attributable to different
allocations of economic rent.  There is nothing in the logic of market economics that tells us that any
particular response parameter  is likely to be large or small, or that rents which do not motivate behaviour
are common or uncommon.  In a world of small elasticities/large rents, you can alter distributions without
greatly affecting the supply of resources. 
The Coase theorem offers a somewhat different explanation.  It isn’t that elasticities of response are
intrinsically small, but that given any distribution or redistribution of property rights/initial incomes, the parties
will make side-payments or other bargains to attain the maximum outcome possible.  Two societies with
very different institutional arrangements will, barring large transactions cost, be able to reach the same
efficient outcome.  This line of thinking suggests further that only efficient institutional interventions or
redistributions will survive in market economies.  The unions and governments who intervene to reduce
inequalities will take into account the potential loss of output from such interventions and choose those that
cause the least harm to efficiency.   If you set minimum wages, you set them relatively modestly so that they
do not reduce employment noticeably.  If you err and push for interventions that will harm efficiency, the
potential losers from the intervention will oppose your initiative.  The more inefficient the intervention, the30
greater the number of losers or the amount of potential loss, and thus the greater will be the opposition.  The
full Coase theorem result may not apply, but the most prevalent institutional interventions are likely to be
those that most efficiently redistribute incomes.
Can institutional differences persist in the modern global economy or does competitiveness
require that labour institutions converge to a single dominant form?  
My answer is that institutional differences can persist.  They can persist rather than converge to a
single institutional form for three reasons: first, because changing institutions can be expensive, so that
maintaining less than ideal arrangements may be better than investing in reform; second, because societies
with differing values will value multi-dimensional outcomes differently and thus choose different
arrangements; and third, because different institutions can attain similar outcomes through different Coase-
type bargaining arrangements to reach efficiency. 
Has the current leading candidate for peak economy, the US, found the right institutions
for the 21st Century?
My answer is  no.   It is safer to think of the US as one of many well-performing economies in a
multi-peaked landscape than as the only economy that really knows what it’s about.  On the basis of current
information, the US passes just one of the five criterion for being the peak economy; this being its admirable
employment record.  A few more years of full employment in the US, accompanied by reductions in
poverty, would lead me to happily revise this judgment.  The problem with assessing institution-outcome
landscapes is that even a correct reading of the current situation may fail to provide much guidance about the
future.  But here analysts of institutions are no more blind seers than any other economists.31
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